Summary‍

A popular uprising supporting the removal of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is highly likely to occur by the next presidential election in 2025. This projected uprising has a greater chance to succeed in achieving its regime change objectives than the previous widespread attempts at removing Lukashenko from office. The most recent mass protest movement in Belarus was crushed thanks in large part to support from the Russian Federation; however, the redirection of Russian security resources to Ukraine combined with the growing strength of Belarusian activist networks has created political opportunities for Belarusian opposition leaders and American leadership to exploit. The potential emergence of a power vacuum in Belarus compromises Russia’s flank and carries security concerns and opportunities for the United States and NATO allies in the region.‍

‍The 2020 Movement ‍

To understand effectively the viability of an anticipated future popular uprising in Belarus, it is vital to understand the origins of the current divide between Minsk and the wider public. In 2020, Belarusian oppositions leaders organized nationwide protests against alleged election rigging by the Lukashenko regime. Over 504 demonstrations occurred in over 88 locations throughout Belarus with some protests having as many as 300,000 individual participants. Demanding Lukashenko’s resignation, these protests rallied behind opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya. President Lukashenko relied on predictable tactics when responding to the opposition movement against him.

Faced with demands for resignation from the protestors and acknowledging an exceedingly high concession cost, President Lukashenko adhered to principles described by Graig Klein and Patrick Regan that justify a coercive response to attempt to end the protest and ensure political survival. The subsequent crackdown on protestors would have incurred extreme costs in the form of the international condemnation, sanctions, and isolation from the international system; however, as Kurt Schock notes in his assessment of protest movements in non-democracies, the near total reliance of a state on a singular external actor can insulate a state like Belarus from pressure from the international system. This explains how the Belarusian crackdown on a popular protest movement avoided risks of the repression backfiring due to the security guarantees and support from Lukashenko’s more powerful Russian neighbor. However, the landscape that allowed for Lukashenko to survive the mass protests in 2020 has eroded leaving him exceedingly vulnerable.

Changing Landscape‍

The prevalence of an ever strengthening abeyance network within Belarus combined with the decline in reliability of Lukashenko’s Russian security guarantees creates new opportunities for opposition leadership to mobilize effectively into a fresh wave of anti-government protests. According to opposition leader Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya the network of Belarusian opposition groups has become increasingly sophisticated. In her words, “People are continuing to fight underground, secretly. People use this time when it’s impossible to demonstrate openly to build structures on the ground.” The growth of these Belarusian abeyance networks since 2020 improves the future potential of mass protest movements. Despite the lack of overt activity, these abeyance networks, as observed by Edmund Cheng and Samson Yuen, continue to preserve values and harden the identity and vision of the movement. This emboldened network of underground activists can observe the waning ability of the Russian state to provide unflinching security support to Belarus.

Substantial Russian investment into its war in Ukraine has resulted in the withdrawal of existing security guarantees in other foreign conflicts. The war in Ukraine has become the sole focus of Russian international efforts since February 2022. This emphasis on Ukraine has resulted in a reduction in Russian troop presence and logistics support in regions like Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Central Asian CSTO partners. The decline in Russian presence, especially among bordering allies, creates tremendous doubt if Russia will follow through on its 2020 promise to deliver a specialized police response force to Belarus to safeguard the regime. The combination of Russia’s focus on Ukraine with the growth of a robust abeyance network in Belarus creates the preconditions for a popular uprising motivated by political opportunism.

The Belarusian case parallels much of Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder’s discussion of political opportunity as a model to explain motivations for nonviolent uprisings. The decline in Minsk’s ability to suppress mass mobilization without the full security support of Moscow creates greater opportunity for the movement to be successful. Combine this emerging reality with a ruling elite who is increasingly isolated from the international system and the opposition can sew divisions that create tremendous opportunity to weaken Lukashenko’s ability to suppress another challenge to his authority. With the next presidential election slated for 2025, the opposition will continue to seize political opportunities to gather public support ensuring their next movement against fraudulent election results will find greater success in ousting President Lukashenko. The outbreak of a mass uprising in Belarus will create opportunities for the United States to help shape the outcome and also creates significant national security implications for the US and its allies.

US Shaping Potential‍

The United States’ primary opportunity to influence the outcome of this anticipated mass uprising is to use the international system to attempt to further exacerbate divisions among the political elite. Currently under significant sanctions, the Belarusian ruling elite could be susceptible to sanctions relief and international reintegration guaranteed by the US. Enticed by financial incentives and political protections, Lukashenko loyalists could begin to cut deals and turn against the regime. A discordant political elite weakens President Lukashenko’s ability to maintain firm control internally over his own government. This top down pressure combined with the opposition’s bottom up resistance to Lukashenko would place tremendous strain on the regime. The political opportunity created by having internal divisions among the elites could embolden an already robust opposition movement. In this way, the United States could effectively serve as a force multiplier for an opposition network that, as Tsikhanouskaya described, has grown increasingly sophisticated since 2020. With the most effective potential shaping action established, it is important to acknowledge the implications of potential outcomes for mass uprising in Belarus.

Implications for the US‍

President Lukashenko will not relinquish his presidency without resistance. Despite the strength of the opposition and the unpredictability of Lukashenko’s Russian support, the potential for this anticipated mass uprising to be unsuccessful in achieving its aims must be considered. If President Lukashenko were to survive a mass uprising, the status quo of the region would be maintained and the implications of US national security would be minimal. The United States could expect a continued partnership between Lukashenko and Moscow with minimal alteration to the current dynamic. However, the security implications become exceedingly greater considering the potential success of mass uprising against the regime.

Emboldened mass protest in Belarus against a weakened regime will contribute to a deteriorating security environment in Eastern Europe if effective in ousting President Lukashenko. This deterioration is significant due to the projected Russian response and the potential liberalization of a Russian neighbor. If a mass uprising were to be successful in Belarus, Russia would likely respond to stabilize its flank and ensure it could continue conducting military operations from Belarus against Ukraine. This response could take the form of partial annexation. The partial annexation would achieve Russia’s security needs for airbases in southern Belarus to support the war effort in Ukraine and could potentially be achieved with minimal resistance due to the political chaos in Minsk. This tactic is not unfamiliar to Russian leadership as the Kremlin employed similar methods to annex Crimea in 2014 during Ukrainian political instability. Further territorial land grabs in Europe by Russia would be seen as provocative and would lead to heightened political tension internationally centered on Russian aggression.

Conversely, the rise of a liberalizing new regime in Minsk could create new opportunities for partnership and collaboration with a Russian neighbor. Concerning American interests, a friendly or more neutral regime in Minsk could reduce security concerns for areas like the Suwalki Gap and the Baltic States. Without Belarus as a guaranteed security partner for Russia, the two sided pressure on the Suwalki Gap and danger to the NATO land bridge to Lithuania would be reduced significantly. However, the increased isolation of Russian Kaliningrad could exacerbate border tensions as the exclave becomes further removed from Russian reinforcements that previously could travel through allied Belarusian territory. In either instance, the rise in political tension between the US and its NATO allies and Russia is likely to increase.